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Thursday 30 April 2009

The difference between conversion and retention

Picked up a piece of analysis today from my newsfeed regarding Twitter audience. Nielsen has posted information about Twitter's month-to-month retention (40%) and compared that to Facebook's and MySpace's. Pete Cashmore over at Mashable promptly misread the basic information and came to an entirely wrong conclusion about the stats, titling his post about it as "60% quit Twitter in the first month". A simple misunderstanding of basic audience analysis like this is the crucial difference between explosively growing traffic and a failure. That's a fail for you, Pete.

What's wrong? Well, retention is a separate matter from conversion. 40% conversion from a trial registration to being a continuing active user to the second month would not be a bad conversion rate. It's not stratospherically great, I've seen better, but I wouldn't be terribly unhappy about such a figure. However, Nielsen didn't say anything at all about first-to-second month conversion. This is what they DID say: "Twitter’s audience retention rate, or the percentage of a given month’s users who come back the following month, is currently about 40 percent."

That's pretty plain English when you take the time to read it. Month to month, regardless of visitor lifetime, not first to second month. On this metric, 40% retention is not good at all, and will definitely be a limiting factor to Twitter's traffic and audience size over time, just the Nielsen article points out (and shows the math for). For any given retention rate, there just is a certain maximum audience reach beyond which any new traffic can't overcome the leaving base, since new traffic is not an inexhaustible supply.

And since today is a busy day, that concludes the free startup advice. Take the time to understand the difference between these metrics, you'll thank yourself for it later.

Thursday 2 April 2009

Amazon order sizes, ideal behaviour, and proof of market friction

I wrote last fall about the "sweet spot" in pricing and spending patterns for a microtransaction-based service and business model, where I posited that given flexible consumption, revenue could be maximized by ensuring the lowest possible minimum price point; one which is preferably closer to 1 cent than one 1 euro. Depending on the goods sold and amount of logistics overhead, the minimum profitable price may of course be much higher, and depending on the payment mechanisms available, the minimum price for which the consumers effort overhead exceeds the cost of the good may also be fairly significant. A chocolate bar may be sellable for 40 cents, while few durable goods can achieve a price point lower than a few euros. For virtual goods, the minimum pricing is mostly a question of efficient mechanism for transferring low amounts of money, because the minimum "size" of the good sold can be in theory reduced ad infinitum, and distribution costs are a non-issue.

Last week there was a Facebook Developer Garage day in San Francisco where a couple of interesting presentations were given. I wasn't there, but browsing through the material I found this slide about the distribution of order sizes among Amazon customers (slide 10 in the deck):

It's interesting to see the similarities on this chart to the behavior in virtual goods. In this data, the observed behavior follows the power law model in an ideal fashion at price points over $25, but the drop-off below that order size is remarkably fast. This is the result of primarily the goods sold and the logistical overheads implicit in that; it just doesn't make much sense for someone to order $5 worth of goods from Amazon given the shipping costs and delays incurred on top of the purchase.

For virtual goods, the drop-off point can be much lower, but still, a similar drop off does happen - again because below a certain price point and transactional overhead level, neither the consumer of the good nor its producer see value in the market. At prices above that, the transactional model does however exhibit the power law distribution. Again, by reducing the minimum marketable and profitable price point, there is a big potential customer base to be gained at the bottom end of the pricing scale. Most companies leave an amazing amount of revenue on the table by not addressing this issue.

Friday 5 September 2008

The sweet spot in free-to-play, pay-for-stuff market

I've been talking recently about a few particularities in the business models based on end-user micropayments that have created lots of followup discussion and questions. So much, in fact, that I decided it's time to try to explain one crucial and somewhat counter-intuitive detail in writing for later reference.

First, a bit of background: this information is based on my work with Habbo over the last 5 years, and is half learned from experience, half based on theoretical models built from that experience. I'm sharing this with the world because while it's been an interesting ride to build an online social game with an end-user business model, breaking pretty much every conventional rule in the process ("games have to have objectives", "there is no profit in micropayments", and so on), it's still better for our business if people understand why it works. If this allows a competitor to fix a problem in their product and get off the ground, so be it - there's plenty of growth to go around here, and failures don't help anyone. As a disclaimer, the numbers I'm discussing here have no relation to Habbo, though the basic observations certainly apply.

Let's start with an obvious statement and follow it up with something less obvious: Everyone wants to maximize revenue per player. However, in a free-to-play environment, where the majority of players do not contribute direct revenue, the right tool for the job is not to try to extract the maximum amount of money from those who do pay - rather, to increase the number of players buying anything at all - even if it's just $1 over their entire lifetime. In other words, it's good to have a lot of very low individual value players.

To explain it in detail, lets look at two assumptions behind a flexible pricing business model: first, that the number of customers grows as the cost of goods drops, and second, that the maximum consumption is unrelated to the minimum. There is no average customer who would spend more than half of others, and less than half of the rest. If there were, the picture of that customer base would look something like the image here, and it's pretty strange looking, wouldn't you say? You've probably seen pictures resembling this one where they don't start from the dominating $0 value point - that's the normal distribution.

The first assumption really is very simple: more people are willing to buy a product at a lower price. This is true for most goods, with some notable exceptions in the luxury goods market, where the perception and desirability of a product goes up with its price. However, it is difficult to create a mass-market luxury item, and those do tend to be cheap (and small).

The second is perhaps slightly more involved especially if one is used to thinking of fixed-price models such as one-time purchase of a boxed product or monthly subscriptions, both of which are difficult to scale up on a revenue per customer basis, so scaling them down is highly undesirable as well. However, it's more clear, if not obvious, by looking at other consumer goods - whether tangible such as drink- and foodstuff or intangible like movies, music and other entertainment. Buying these once certainly does not exclude further sales of the same product to the same customer - rather, it's a strong indicator of sales potential!

The free-to-play, pay-for-stuff model follows both of these assumptions. Cheap purchase price attracts more customers out of the existing free users, and transactional item-based sales allows repeat purchases of theoretically unlimited amount. Those who are willing to buy more will do so, up to some practical maximum of consumable goods and discretionary spending.

In this environment, focusing on higher-paying customers makes sense only if the number of customers drops by less than half when the revenue per customer doubles. Again, with the exception of some luxury goods segments, this rarely happens. Think about it: how many chocolate bars of standard quality would you expect to sell for $1? How about for $2? More or less than half? How about for $10 for the exact same package? I'd wager chocolate bars sell at least 10x better at the price of $1 than at the price of $10 each, and the increase of customer base more than covers the lower per-unit revenue.

This is a simple exhibit of power-law market dynamics, and is easiest observed when looked at through a logarithmic chart. Readers of books like The Long Tail or Critical Mass should not be surprised. There's a twist through - because this starts from zero gains (at the free players), the exponential behaviour follows a different path in the beginning. This model also turns Pareto's Law on its head - due to the (in my experience) relatively high exponent, the highest total value is at the lowest end of the spending.

Now, of course there is a minimum profitable price for a bar of chocolate that does not become near-$0 even at very high volumes, unlike purely digital products, so increasing chocolate-sales revenue by dropping prices does not necessarily increase profits, and I'm completely ignoring the effects of packaging and marketing on the perceived value of items. For digital sales, where packaging is more flexible and material costs are effectively non-existent, we still have to consider not-unsubstantial fixed development costs, a certain amount of costs associated to servers and bandwidth, some transaction-related pricing friction, and so forth, but certainly the minimum value (and price) of one unit of digital sales can be driven much lower than a bar of chocolate.

Thursday 3 April 2008

Nokia loses share among global youth, music on mobiles doubles popularity

We just released the results of our second global Habbo youth survey. For this 2007 edition, over 58,000 people contacted via the Habbo sites in 31 countries answered a survey the results of which have been painstakingly analyzed for weeks, nay, months by our in house analytics team.

Among the findings is tha majority of teens are now using their phones as mp3 players, that being almost twice as popular at 71 percent of the surveyed. Sure sign of convergence there. Sony Ericsson has enjoyed a rise in popularity thanks to this trend, and while Nokia is still the global leader in the teen segment as well as overall, it has lost some ground among teens.

This and a lot more, 250 pages worth of brilliant insight, can be found in the book we released in Virtual Worlds Conference today. We're selling this for €475 a piece, a real bargain for the content, because we figured it'll be more useful widely distributed rather than if sold at the typical market research prices. Check out the links above for more info.